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A DECADE EXAMINED: A REVIEW OF THE RECOVERY
UNDER MISSISSIPPI'S CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMS
David F Maron* & Samuel D. Gregory**
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, many reviewers-supporters and critics alike-
have studied and commented on Mississippi's legal and tort reforms.
Judged objectively, by the late 1990s and early 2000s, Mississippi's civil jus-
tice system was in a crisis. For example, prior to 1995, Mississippi courts
had not produced a damage verdict greater than $9 million.' But by the
early 2000s, that had changed.2 This change earned Mississippi the reputa-
tion as a "magnet for liability lawsuits, a Mecca for frivolous lawsuits, with
unlimited damages."3
In 2002, through legislative changes followed by other judicial and leg-
islative reforms, Mississippi began to address the crisis and implement
needed civil justice reforms. Many of the issues that caused several Missis-
sippi venues to be labeled among the worst judicial venues have been cor-
rected. Nearly all the reforms, such as venue, joinder, joint and several
liability, and pleading standards are now well established and fully inte-
grated within the judicial system. But one reform (the statutory cap on
noneconomic damages) continues to face some challenges. This article
provides an overview of some of the more established reforms, along with
context and a brief analysis of the authority that led to those changes. This
Article then reviews the current status of nationwide jurisprudence on
noneconomic damage caps with an emphasis on recent litigation challeng-
ing Mississippi's caps on noneconomic damages.
* David F. Maron is a shareholder in the Jackson office of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell
& Berkowitz, PC, and is a member of the firm's Litigation and Product Liability & Mass Tort Groups.
He was an invited panelist in the 2015 Mississippi College School of Law Tort Reform Symposium and
has authored several articles regarding trends of various litigation reform in Mississippi.
** Samuel D. Gregory is an associate in the Jackson office of Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, and is a member of the firm's litigation practice group. He has co-authored
another article regarding the constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps. He received a J.D. from
Mississippi College School of Law and a M.B.A from Mississippi College both in 2013.
1. David Clark, Life in Lawsuit Central: An Overview of the Unique Aspects of Mississippi's
Civil Justice System, 71 Miss. L.J. 359, 362 (2001).
2. Given Mississippi's comparatively small population and lack of many large businesses or in-
dustry, this increase was dramatic. From "1994 to 2000, Mississippi had the second highest percentage
of jury verdicts over $1 million of all the fifty states ... passing all except New York in this dubious
category." Id. at 363-64 (citing Current Award Trends in Personal Injury, 2001 Edition, Jury Verdict
Research Series (LRP Publications, 2002) at 35-36)).
3. Id. at 361 (citing Robert Pear, Mississippi Gaining as a Lawsuit Mecca, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20
2001 at Al).
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II. PRE-TORT REFORM LANDSCAPE IN MISSISSIPPI
For those readers who only have anecdotal impressions of the pre-re-
form litigation climate in Mississippi, an historic overview provides an im-
portant background. In 2001, Dick Thornburgh observed that Mississippi
had "earned a reputation as a mecca for litigators."4 He commented:
It does not reflect well on your state or your civil justice
system when small business owners can't afford liability in-
surance because rates have become so expensive, when doc-
tors stop performing high-risk procedures because of
enormous concerns about medical malpractice liability and
when physicians and pharmacists hesitate to prescribe and
dispense FDA-approved drugs for fear of product liability
suits. These are warning signs in response to which you
must begin to fashion a response.5
He also observed Mississippi's civil justice system had become "some-
thing of a legal lottery propelled by visions of huge damage awards and
equally outside legal fees."6 This, and a number of other factors contrib-
uted to Mississippi's threatening legal landscape: abuse of (or failure to
enforce) Mississippi's joinder rule,7 forum shopping under venue statutes,8
multi-million dollar verdicts,9 and defendants settling to avoid litigation
risks in what were labeled judicial "hellholes."'" This rise in litigation did
not occur in isolation. The filings were fueled by aggressive marketing to
and solicitation11 of numerous potential plaintiffs who were then
4. Dick Thornburgh, Litigation in Mississippi Today, 71 Miss. L.J. 505, 514-15 (2001).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 506.
7. See Miss. R. Cirv. P. 20 cmt. (2003) (pre-amendment comment noted that Rule 20 allowed
virtually unlimited joinder at pleading stage); See also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Travis, 808 So. 2d 928, 931
(Miss. 2002)(citing the official comment to the pre-amendment Rule 20 held, "The general philosophy
of these Rules is to allow virtually unlimited joinder at the pleading stage, but to give the Court discre-
tion to shape the trial to the necessities of the particular case.") overruled by Capital City Ins. Co, v.
G.B. "Boots" Smith Corp, 889 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 2004) abrogated by Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories. v.
Caldwell, 905 So. 2d 1205 (Miss 2005).
8. Prior to various venue reforms, Mississippi law provided that in cases with multiple defend-
ants: "if one of the defendants is a non-resident of the State, the plaintiff may bring suit against the non-
resident in the county of plaintiff's residence. Jurisdiction and venue of that nonresident makes the
county of plaintiff's residence the proper venue against all resident defendants even though they may
live in different counties." Senatobia Cmty. Hosp. v. Orr. 607 So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Miss. 1992) (emphasis
added) overruled by Capital City Ins. Co. v. G.B. "Boots" Smith Corp., 889 So. 2d 505, 516-17 (Miss.
2004) (holding that the suit in plaintiff's home county is never an option when a resident defendant is
sued therefore analysis in Orr was flawed and therefore overruled).
9. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Now Open for Business: The Transformation of Missis-
sippi's Legal Climate, 24 Miss COL. L. REV. 393, 400 (2005) (discussing extraordinary verdicts and large
punitive damage awards).
10. Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts' Duty to Help
Solve the Asbestos Litigation Crisis, NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2002) at 12-
13 (hereinafter "Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership").
11. The volume of new mass tort filings also had been fueled by an aggressive solicitation of new
plaintiffs through advertising. Some of these ads more benignly beckoned "all contract, union ..
workers ... [y]ou may have been exposed to asbestos and silica sand for a period of time and may be
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"screened" for targeted conditions and aggregated together in large cases
with hundreds if not thousands of other plaintiffs unrelated in all respects
except for a common screening result. For example, during the Daubert
hearings in In re Silica, it became clear that nearly 10,000 silica claims had
been generated by screening companies.
12
Mississippi became a lawsuit "Mecca"13 as New York Times columnist
Robert Pear put it. Or as a leading plaintiff's attorney described it, Missis-
sippi was one of the "magic jurisdictions."'4 With aggressive solicitation,
many asymptomatic plaintiffs from around the nation flooded into Missis-
sippi's courts-diluting, devaluing, and delaying claims of injured plaintiffs.
Defendants were also affected. With the improper joinder of hun-
dreds (and frequently thousands) of dissimilar claims in single cases; the
liberal application of Mississippi's venue statutes, joinder rule, and joint
and several liability; and several other factors, this mass of cases aggregated
tens of thousands of claims in only a handful of Mississippi jurisdictions.
Defendants many times were coerced into settlements instead of risking
trials in unwieldy and massive cases in dangerous plaintiff-favoring venues.
A strategy that was openly acknowledged by a leading plaintiff's lawyer:
"[you] raise the stakes so high that they can't afford to lose or can't afford
to go to trial."' 5 Vast inventories of mass tort cases were settled with little
eligible to be screened for ASBESTOSIS, MESOTHELIOMA, LUNG CANCER, OR SILICOSIS."
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 597 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (capitalization in original).
Others were more aggressive. In one reported instance, the ad enticed would-be plaintiffs: "Find out if
YOU have MILLION DOLLAR LUNGS!" See Pamela Sherrid, Looking for Some Million Dollar
Lungs, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 17, 2001 (on file with authors). Aside from the patently
conscience-shocking implication that compared diagnoses of incurable and often fatal diseases to the
"excitement" of winning the lottery, such aggressive solicitation apparently was successful and garnered
plaintiffs' counsel "inventories" of thousands of clients.
12. Based on testimony from the 2005 hearings, the Court described the assembly line screening
process as follows:
a) the law firm provided the screening company with a list of people (for instance, existing
asbestos plaintiffs or workers at industrial sites); b) either the law firm or the screening com-
pany sent out a mass e-mail asking the recipient to call the screening company's toll-free num-
ber; c) the staff answering the phone would ask if the caller had been exposed to silica; and, d)
for those who showed some form of being exposed to silica," the caller would be encouraged
to attend the mass screening .f..[oin the day of the screening, the screening company parked
its van or truck in the parking lot of a hotel or retail establishment... As each client arrived in
front of the van or trailer, a receptionist greeted the client and using a standard form prepared
by the screening company or law firm, verified that the client had an appointment and the
information previously given by the client over the telephone. The client then underwent a
chest X-ray.
In re Silica, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 597-598 (internal citations omitted).
13. Robert Pear, Mississippi Gaining as a Lawsuit Mecca, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001 at Al.
14. Judicial Hellholes (2011-2012), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/
Judicial-Hellholes-2011.pdf (last accessed June 25, 2015) ("What I call the 'magic jurisdiction,' [is]
where the judiciary is elected with verdict money. The trial lawyers have established relationships with
the judges ... and it's almost impossible to get a fair trial if you're a defendant in some of these places
.... Any lawyer fresh out of law school can walk in there and win the case, so it doesn't matter what the
evidence or law is.") (quoting Richard "Dickie" Scruggs).
15. Richard Scruggs, Esq., Tobacco Lawyers' Roundtable: A Report from the Front Lines, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 545 (2001).
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or no detailed information about the plaintiffs' alleged injuries or the ac-
tual products that they used or were exposed to, much less information
regarding the actual basis for liability of each defendant.
III. THE PRINCIPLE REFORMS.
Significant legislative reforms were enacted in both 2002 and 2004.
The Mississippi legislature passed comprehensive reforms which addressed
venue, joint and several liability, punitive damage caps, innocent seller is-
sues, apportionment of fault, and caps on noneconomic damages. Addi-
tionally, Mississippi Supreme Court opinions ordered severance,16 enforced
a rigorous pleading standard,17 exposed the flaws in mass screening,'s and
adopted or amended rules including those that allowed independent medi-
cal examinations9 and heightened standard for admissibility of expert
testimony.20
A. Rule 20 and Janssen: Severing Improperly Joined Plaintiffs
The first major procedural reform was the February 19, 2004 landmark
decision of Janssen v. Armond.21 Armond, and its later progeny,22 as well
as the February 20, 2004 amendment o the comment to Mississippi Rule of
Civil Procedure 20,23 all require the severance of improperly joined plain-
tiffs whose claims do not arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence,"
and are not linked by a common litigable event.24
16. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092 (Miss. 2004).
17. Harold's Auto Parts, Inc., v. Mangialardi, 889 So. 2d 493 (Miss. 2004).
18. In re Silica Products Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 597 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
19. Miss. R. Civ. P. 35.
20. Miss. R. EvID. 702.
21. Armond, 866 So. 2d at 1092.
22. See, e.g., Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Scott, 876 So. 2d 306 (Miss. 2004); Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Grant, 873 So. 2d 100 (Miss. 2004); Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.
2d 31 (Miss. 2004); Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Keys, 879 So. 2d 446 (Miss. 2004); and Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Jackson, 893 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 2004); Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Estate of Heffner,
904 So. 2d100, (Miss. 2004).
23. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 cmt. Mississippi Rule 20 requires that all plaintiffs' claims: (1) must
arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or the same series of transactions or occurrences; and (2)
must involve some common question of law or fact. Id. The "phrase 'transaction or occurrence' re-
quires that there be a distinct litigable event linking the parties." Id. (emphasis added).
24. Although the Supreme Court first addressed the improper joinder in pharmaceutical cases, it
has been applied to many other categories of claims and cases. See 3M Co. v. Johnson, 895 So. 2d 151,
159 (Miss. 2005) ("Although asbestos litigation is a 'mature tort' as discussed in dicta in Armond, this
Court does not intend, nor will we proceed to exempt such cases from the requirements of Rule 20.");
3M Co. v. Glass, 917 So. 2d 90 (Miss. 2005) (silica); See also Harold's Auto Parts, Inc., v. Mangialardi,
889 So. 2d 493 (Miss. 2004). The Mississippi Supreme Court broadly proclaimed that "our holding in
Armond and its progeny is that plaintiffs may not be joined under Rule 20 unless their claims are




The term "distinct litigable event" was not unknown to Mississippi law
since the term "same litigable event" had been included in the pre-amend-
ment Rule 20 comment and is complementary to the current "distinct liti-
gable event.' 25 But whether "two or more plaintiffs' claims arise from a
distinct litigable event is very much fact dependent.' 26 The Court in Illi-
nois Central R.R. Co. v. Adams,7 explained that to "be bound together by
some distinguishable litigable event ... there must be some claim of wrong-
ful conduct or actionable conduct which, if proven by plaintiffs at trial,
would result in liability of the defendant to all joined plaintiffs. "28
In a series of cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that the
following allegations cannot be the sole basis for joining plaintiffs under
Rule 20: alleging that plaintiffs were exposed to the same product,29 allega-
tions that the plaintiffs had a common worksite/employer,30 allegations of
mass fraud and common misrepresentation,3 ' or allegations of an industry-
wide conspiracy.32
B. Rules 8, 9, 10 and 11: Enforcing the Pleading Standard
In addition to the volume of cases generated by the improper joinder
of hundreds, and even thousands, of plaintiffs, the lack of basic core infor-
mation regarding individual plaintiff's claims was yet another significant
factor. While the language of the Rules of Civil Procedure simply requires
"notice pleading," many large tort cases were more akin to "mystery plead-
ing." Or to borrow the explanation given by a recent political figure: "we
have to pass the bill so that you can find out what is in it. ' '33
Defendants were compelled to incur ongoing legal fees, conduct exten-
sive discovery, and blindly litigate these cases simply to find out why they
had been sued, by whom and for what. The pleading in these complaints,
other than for a few "trial" or "lead" plaintiffs, gave little or no information
about plaintiffs. The "threat" of trial setting for "trial plaintiffs" cases in
some of Mississippi's "magic jurisdictions," combined with utter lack of in-
formation on remaining plaintiffs, created tremendous improper settlement
25. 111. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 912 So. 2d 829, 834 (Miss. 2005); but see Alexander v. AC And
S, Inc., 947 So. 2d 891, 899 n.2 (Miss. 2007) (Diaz, J. dissenting) in which Justice Diaz dissenting com-
mented that "distinct litigable event" is an "odd term" with "no basis in prior Mississippi law."
26. Ili. Cent. R.R., 912 So. 2d at 834.
27. 922 So. 2d 787 (Miss. 2006).
28. Id. at 789-790 (applying Armond and Miss R. Civ. P. 20).
29. Purdue Pharma v. Heffner, 904 So. 2d 100, 103 (Miss. 2004) ("The mere taking of the same
prescription drug does not supply the plaintiff with the same transaction or occurrence, or the same
transactions or occurrences, as required by Rule 20."); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Rogers, 912 So.2d
853, 858 (Miss. 2005).
30. Crossfield Products Corp. v. Irby, 910 So. 2d 498, 501 (Miss. 2005) (holding that merely work-
ing at a common workplace does not establish "distinct litigable event linking the parties together").
31. Miss. Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 905 So. 2d 1179, 1184-85 (Miss. 2005).
32. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So. 2d 1092, 1098 (Miss. 2004) (citing Insolia v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 547, 549 (W.D. Wis. 1999)).
33. Slaughter House Rules, how Democrats may 'deem' ObamaCare into law, without voting, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAl, Mar. 16, 2010, (quoting Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/SB10001424052748703909804575123512773070080. (last accessed June 25, 2015).
20151
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leverage on these massive cases. It was a candid and troubling observation
noted by former United States Attorney General, Griffin B. Bell:
The selective filing of non-sick claimants in courts that will
not turn these claims away coerces defendants into settling
unsubstantiated claims by the non-sick. Certain courts will
not scrutinize the unsubstantiated claims, and plaintiff law-
yers often will not settle the substantiated claims absent
payment for their nonsick inventories.
34
In its 2004 landmark ruling, Harold's Auto Parts v. Flower Mangi-
alardi,35 the Mississippi Supreme Court again addressed improper joinder
36
and also condemned the practice of "shotgun" style complaints,37 labeling
that pleading practice a "perversion of the judicial system unknown prior
to the filing of mass tort cases."38 The Mangialardi ruling not only required
severance of the 264 asbestos plaintiffs, but also required each severed
plaintiff to sue only the defendants against whom he had a claim.39
A year later in 3M et al. v. Glass,4° (a silica case) the Mississippi Su-
preme Court again affirmed that a plaintiff cannot shift his burden to both
know and disclose (through pleading)41 the core information as to each
individual plaintiff: "[W]e reject the notion that a plaintiff may shift to a
defendant the light burden imposed by notice pleading requirements."42
While this series of decisions provided relief to defendants, over the
years these reforms have not been not unreasonably applied so as to
prejudice plaintiffs.43 For example, in Illinois Central R.R. Company v.
Easterwood,4 a suit brought by 54 plaintiffs against a single defendant, the
court applied Mangialardi and declined to dismiss a single plaintiff's
amended complaint even though he "[could] not recall specific asbestos (or
34. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts' Duty to Help Solve
the Asbestos Litigation Crisis, https://www.heartland.org/sites/alllmodules/customlheartland migration/
files/ pdfs/9142.pdf. (last accessed June 25, 2015).
35. 889 So. 2d 493 (Miss. 2004).
36. "In [Mangialardi] we were faced not only with misjoined plaintiffs but also with inadequate
pleading." Canadian Nat'l v. Smith, 926 So. 2d 839, 843 (Miss. 2006).
37. See also Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1130 (11th Cir. 2001) "In Byrne, the court observed
'Why... would a lawyer engage in shotgun pleading? Plaintiffs file shotgun complaints and include
frivolous claims to extort the settlement of a meritorious claim; worse yet, they file shotgun complaints
to extort the settlement of unmeritorious claims."' Chancellor v. Parker, Case No. CV-040BE-2554-S,
at 3, n. 1. (N.D. Ala. 2004) (Order Dismissing the Case).
38. Mangialardi, 889 So. 2d at 495.
39. Id.
40. 917 So. 2d 90 (Miss. 2005).
41. This requirement is not new, "Mangialardi simply reminds the Bar ...." See Glass, 917 So.
2d at 93 (discussing requirements of Rules 8, 9, 10, and 11). Even under the relaxed "notice pleading"
standard, Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 8 "[did] not eliminate the necessity of stating circum-
stances, occurrences, and events which support the proffered claim." Miss. R. Civ. P. 8, cmt.
42. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Adams, 922 So. 2d 787, 790-91 (Miss. 2006).
43. Glass, 917 So. 2d at 92.
44. 939 So. 2d 769 (Miss. 2006).
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silica) containing products and material that he worked around while an
employee of Defendant ....
C. Venue: Stop the Shopping
The effect of "magic jurisdictions" was not the overly dramatic stuff of
urban legend, nor is it merely anecdotal. The weight of the dockets gener-
ated was documented by the sheer number of filings in certain venues.
Venue is a significant right. And the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Mangialardi also expressly required plaintiffs' counsel to have a good faith
belief that "each plaintiff has an appropriate cause of action to assert
against a defendant in the jurisdiction where the complaint is to be filed. To
do otherwise is an abuse of the system and is sanctionable.' ' 46 Given the
evolution of Mississippi's "magic jurisdictions ' 47 it "is no coincidence that a
few jurisdictions have become the favorite locations for plaintiff
attorneys. "48
Venue shopping literally swamped the courts in several Mississippi
counties with tens of thousands of mass tort claimants. But with severance
required by both Rule 20 and Armond, each plaintiff is now required to
independently establish venue or risk dismissal.49 This rule equitably bal-
anced the interests of all sides: if a claim had been improperly joined and
dismissed, the plaintiff would be allowed to refile "a new action for the
"950same cause, at any time within one year ....
D. Rule 35: Evaluate the Plaintiff
Until January 2003, when the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted Mis-
sissippi Rule of Civil Procedure 35,51 defendants had been without one of
the fundamental tools in defending personal injury and emotional distress
claims-an independent medical examination of the plaintiff.5 2 With the
adoption of Rule 35, defendants in Mississippi state courts (for the first
time) were given the mechanism to request and conduct physical and
mental examinations of plaintiffs.53 These examinations afforded defend-
ants the procedural mechanism to examine and challenge the veracity of a
45. Id. at 771.
46. Harold's Auto Parts v. Flower Mangialardi, 889 So. 2d 493, 494 (Miss 2004). (citing Miss. R.
Civ. P. 11) (first emphasis original, second emphasis added).
47. See supra n.13-14 and accompanying text.
48. Bell, supra n.34 at 21.
49. The Supreme Court provided additional guidance for trial courts when severing and transfer-
ring improperly joined claims in the subsequent case of Canadian National v. Smith, 926 So. 2d 839, 845
(Miss. 2006).
50. Id. (citing the Mississippi Savings Statute, Miss CODE ANN. § 15-1-69 (1972)). But this sav-
ings "did not deprive the defendant[s] of seeking dismissal for [plaintiff's] failure to file the original
action within the applicable statute of limitations." Id. (citing Evans v. Broadhead, 233 So. 2d 771, 774
(Miss. 1970)).
51. Miss. R. Civ. P. 35 (adopted by Supreme Court in Order dated January 16, 2003).
52. Miss. R. Civ. P. 35 cmt. ("[P]reviously, the omission in the Mississippi Rules of Civil Proce-
dure of a counterpart to Federal Rule 35 was held to preclude a state court from ordering an examina-
tion under any circumstances.") (citing Swan v. I.P., Inc., 613 So. 2d 846, 859 (Miss. 1993)).
53. Miss. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
2015]
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plaintiff's claims and, in some cases, provided the needed evidence to chal-
lenge many litigation-driven "diagnoses."
But Mississippi Courts have not interpreted Rule 35 to give defendants
an unfettered right to examine plaintiffs. Rule 35 itself requires a court
order upon motion of the party seeking the examination.5 4 And in Le-
Blanc v. Andrews, the Court of Appeals affirmed the chancery court's deci-
sion to not require a mental examination of a husband in a divorce
proceeding despite expert testimony that an exam was necessary.55 The
chancellor found the testimony of one minor child, who stated she did not
fear the defendant or feel unsafe around him, sufficient to deny the re-
quested examination.56 This holding is consistent with cases interpreting
Federal Rule 35,57 upon which Mississippi's Rule 35 is based.58
E. Rule 702 and Daubert: The Court as Gatekeeper
For years, Mississippi had followed the Frye general acceptance test
regarding admissibility of expert testimony.59 But on May 29, 2003, the
Mississippi Supreme Court amended Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702 to
"clarify the gatekeeping responsibility of the courts in evaluating the ad-
missibility of expert testimony.'"60 In clarifying a trial courts' responsibility,
the Supreme Court struck all references to the prior Frye and House tests.
It adopted a modified Daubert standard and recognized that under Kumho
Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, Rule 702 was the standard "for other fields as
well as for scientific testimony. "61
In addition to amending Rule 702 and its comment, the court in Mis-
sissippi Transportation Commission v. McLemore expressly held: "[T]his
court today adopts the federal standards and applies our amended Rule
702 for assessing the reliability and admissibility of expert testimony. "62 It
54. Id.
55. 931 So. 2d 683, 689 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
56. Id.
57. Teche Lines v. Boyette, 111 F.2d 579, 581 (5th Cir. 1940) (ordering Rule 35 examination was
within district court's discretion). There are very few cases interpreting Mississippi Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 35. Where no state interpretive authority exists concerning a rule, the court will rely on federal
decisions interpreting corresponding federal rules. Nichols v. Tubb, 609 So. 2d 377, 383 (Miss. 1992).
58. There are very few cases interpreting Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 35. Where no state
interpretive authority exists concerning a rule, the court will rely on federal decisions interpreting cor-
responding federal rules. Nichols, 609 So. 2d at 383.
59. See e.g., Mattox v. State, 128 So. 2d 368, 372-73 (Miss. 1961); Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
60. Miss. R. EvID. 702 cmt. Interestingly, this amendment was not adopted unanimously. Two
Justices dissented stating, "I have to wonder how many members of this Court have tried a case where
they presented an expert witness. This amendment puts restraints on the evidence and is not in the best
interest of justice.'" In re Miss Rules of Evidence, In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, No. 89-R-99002-
SCT (Order May 29, 2003, Easley, J., dissenting) http://courts.ms.gov/rules/ruleamendments/2003/
sn104780.pdf (last accessed June 5, 2015).
61. Miss R. EvID. 702 cmt (amendment to comment described application of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) as
standards for admission of expert testimony under Rule 702).
62. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 39 (Miss. 2004).
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further explained that revised Rule 702 had "effectively tightened not loos-
ened, the allowance of expert testimony."63 The McLemore court struck
would-be expert testimony as speculative.64
This heightened standard for admissibility of expert testimony has
served its intended purpose of safeguarding against improper and unrelia-
ble expert testimony. Comprehensive mpirical studies have shown that
"Daubert is a stricter standard than Frye for the admissibility of expert tes-
timony., 65 It has given litigants and courts significant tools to examine,
expose, and exclude improper litigation-driven "diagnoses" as well as all
areas of "junk science" that do not meet the required standards of reliabil-
ity and admissibility.
F. Innocent Seller
The Mississippi Legislature enacted the first of two Innocent Seller
statutes with the 2002 Bill. Codified at section 11-1-64, this new statute
made great progress in recognizing an innocent seller doctrine. Prior to its
passage, federal courts in Mississippi refused to find improper joinder of
mere sellers of products.6 6 But the wording of the statute demonstrates
that it was a product of legislative compromise. Initially, the innocent
seller defense was an effort to prevent plaintiff's from joining resident re-
tailers (merely sellers putting product in stream of commerce) to destroy
federal court's diversity jurisdiction. Under section 11-1-64, after 60 days
of discovery the innocent seller could be dismissed "without prejudice" but
even with "dismissal," inexplicably the dismissed "innocent" seller had to
remain a party67 to the case for the sole purpose of preventing defendants
from removing the case to federal court.68 Cases were nevertheless
63. Id. at 38 (emphasis added); Cf House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 822 (Miss. 1984) (former
general acceptance test inquired: "Is the field of expertise one in which it is has been scientifically
established that due investigation and study in conformity with techniques and practices generally ac-
cepted within the field will produce a valid opinion? Where the answer to this question is in the affirm-
ative, we generally allow expert testimony." (emphasis added) (cited in comment to pre-amendment
Miss. R. EvID 702)).
64. McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 43.
65. Andrew Jurs and Scott DeVito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment Of Daubert's
Effect On Civil Defendants, 62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 675, 679 (Spring 2013).
66. Haley v. Hammett Autos., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (finding fraudulent
joinder based on section 11-1-64, but, citing Clark v. Williamson, 129 F. Supp. 2d 956, 960-61 (S.D. Miss.
2000), noted that prior to enactment of sectionll-1-64 federal courts remanded cases because Missis-
sippi law had allowed recovery "from either a manufacturer or a seller of a product.").
67. The order of dismissal remained interlocutory until final disposition of the plaintiff's claim.
See Miss CODE ANN. § 11-1-64(6) (2002) ("No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to
divest a court of venue or jurisdiction otherwise proper at the time the action was commenced. A
defendant dismissed pursuant to this section shall be considered to remain a part to such action only for
such purposes.").
68. United States District Judge Mills (a former Mississippi legislator who was a principal archi-
tect of the product liability statute and was not unaware of the workings of Mississippi's legislative
process) remarked in Henderson v. Ford Motor Company that the Mississippi Legislature's clear intent
was a compromise to allow dismissal of innocent sellers, but was designed to "defeat removal jurisdic-
tion." 340 F. Supp. 2d 722, 728 (N.D. Miss. 2004).
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removed and federal courts routinely denied remand.69 Ultimately, section
11-1-64 was "repealed outright during the 2004 special [tort reform]
session. "70
The current Innocent Seller defense enacted as part of the 2004 tort
reform legislation-codified at section 11-1-63(h)71-eliminated the anti-
removal provisions and provided clear direction to trial courts. Sectionll-
1-63(h) provides that sellers "shall not be liable" in actions for defective
products unless they fall into one of three categories:
Sellers who exercised "substantial control over that aspect
of design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling the
product that caused the alleged harm ..."
Sellers who "altered or modified the product, and the alter-
ation or modification was a substantial factor in causing the
harm ..."
Sellers who "had actual or constructive knowledge of the
defective condition of the product at the time he or she sup-
plied [it]."
72
For added clarity, the Mississippi Legislature in the last sentence of
this subsection clearly announced that "[it is the intent of [sectionll-1-
63(h)] to immunize innocent sellers who are not actively negligent, but in-
stead are mere conduits of a product.
'7 3
69. See, e.g,. Weathersby v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2006 WL1487025 (N.D. Miss. May 24,2006); Lott
v. Chickasaw Equip. Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 749 (N.D. Miss. 2005); Haley, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 639; Burton
v. Werner Co. 335 F. Supp. 2d 734 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (holding that insofar as section 11-1-64 would
operate to prevent defendants from their "statutory right to remove" such actions to federal court, it
conflicted not only with "removal statutes but also with Article VI, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution
which provides that 'the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....');
see also Henderson, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 728. In Henderson, Judge Mills denied the plaintiffs motion to
remand, but certified his ruling for interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at
728. Despite the court's certification, the Fifth Circuit "denied [plaintiff's] motion for interlocutory
appeal without explanation.'" See Lott, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
70. Henderson, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 727.
71. The section was codified as follows:
In any action alleging that a product is defective pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the
seller of a product other than the manufacturer shall not be liable unless the seller exercised
substantial control over that aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling
of the product that caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; or the seller
altered or modified the product, and the alteration or modification was a substantial factor in
causing the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; or the seller had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the defective condition of the product at the time he supplied the product. It
is the intent of this section to immunize innocent sellers who are not actively negligent, but
instead are mere conduits of a product.
MISS CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(h) (1972).
72. Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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G. Apportionment Based on Fault: Section 85-5-7
Prior to the 2002 Mississippi tort reform legislation amending section
85-5-7, juries were allowed to allocate fault both to named defendants and
to most non-joined alleged tortfeasors.74 But juries were not permitted to
consider the fault of an absent and immune tortfeasors.75 Additionally,
under pre-2002 law, once the percentage of fault had been allocated, each
tortfeasor became jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff to the extent
necessary for the plaintiff to recover 50% of his recoverable damages.
Under this standard, a defendant only 1% at fault would still have been
forced to pay up to 50% of the recoverable damages.76 The inherent un-
predictability and unfairness of the problems caused by these provisions
were addressed first in the 2002 tort reform bill, with further reforms in
2004.
The current section 85-5-7, as now revised and amended by the 2004
tort reform legislation,77 made significant strides to eliminate much of the
inherit unfairness under Mississippi's joint and several liability. The new
statute eliminated several subsections entirely,78 and now provides that
other than for defendants who "consciously and deliberately pursue a com-
mon plan or design" or "actively take part in it," 79 each defendant will be
liable only for the damages proportionate to his percentage of fault.8 0
H. Punitive Damage Caps
Mississippi's punitive damages statute was first enacted in 1993.1 Sim-
ilar to the punitive damage system we have today, the statute required
proof that the defendant acted with malice or gross negligence, and that the
74. Alleged tortfeasors may not have been joined due to settlement, because the alleged
tortfeasor was outside the court's jurisdiction, or for other reasons.
75. Accu-Fab & Constr. v. Ladner, 778 So. 2d 766 (Miss. 2001), overruled by Mack Trucks v.
Tackett, 841 So. 2d 1107 (Miss. 2003).
76. See e.g., Mack Trucks, 841 So. 2d at 1116-17.
77. For cases filed between January 1, 2003 and September 1, 2004, the applicable version of
section 85-5-7 (MIss CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (Rev. 2002)) requires the jury to determine the percentage of
fault for each joint tortfeasor, including named parties and absent tortfeasors, without regard to
whether the absent joint tortfeasor (such as an employer protected by Workers' Compensation exclu-
sivity) is immune. And it also provides that noneconomic damages (e.g., pain and suffering) are not
subject to joint and several liability. Consequently a defendant's liability is several only for the percent-
age of fault allocated to it by the jury for noneconomic damages; and one defendant cannot be forced to
pay any noneconomic damages caused by the conduct of another tortfeasor. Furthermore, for eco-
nomic damages (e.g., lost wages), joint and several liability was abolished for any defendant determined
to be less than 30% at fault. Defendants found to be more than 30% at fault will continue to face joint
and several liability to the extent necessary for the plaintiff to recover up to 50% of his recoverable
economic damages.
78. Section (2) of the prior statute allowed for joint and several liability for damages caused by
two or more persons for up to 50% percent of the plaintiff's recoverable damages. And section (4) of
the prior statute provided for contribution among tortfeasors held jointly liable up to the amount equal
to the percentage of fault allocated to that defendant. Old section (8) provided the method of appor-
tioning fault among all defendants. See Miss CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (pre-2002 version).
79. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(4) (Supp. 2004).
80. Id. at § 85-5-7(2) (Supp. 2004).
81. 1993 Miss. Laws Ch. 302 § 2(1)(a) (H.B. 1270) (adopting Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (1972)).
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plaintiff first receive an award of compensatory damages.82 Notwithstand-
ing, juries were returning enormous punitive damage awards that were
many times greater than the compensatory award.83 Mississippi was not
alone in this regard. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the United
States Supreme Court established standards and placed parameters on ex-
cessive punitive damage verdicts.84
While the United States Supreme Courts' opinion in Gore held that a
punitive damage award could be so excessive as to violate a defendant's
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, it also recognized
that "States necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the
level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes of cases
and in any particular case."
85
As part of the 2002 reforms, the Mississippi Legislature amended sec-
tion 11-1-65 to include caps on punitive damages based on a defendant's
net worth.86 These caps were amended again slightly in 2004 to further
reduce the maximum punitive damage award against certain defendants.87
Today, punitive damage awards are governed by the provisions in section
11-1-65, providing further protection to defendants in addition to the due
process protections enunciated in Gore and its progeny.
I. Noneconomic Damage Caps
Similar to the cap on punitive damages, as part of its tort reform mea-
sures in 2002 and 2004, the Mississippi Legislature also established caps on
the recoverable amount of noneconomic damages. As one author contem-
poraneously observed, "[e]xtremely high jury verdicts indicate that limits
on non-economic damage are also appropriate in Mississippi."88 Missis-
sippi's noneconomic damage caps were first added as part of the 2002 legis-
lative session." Initially, the caps only applied to medical malpractice
claims and capped noneconomic damages at $500,000.90 The 2004 tort
82. Id.
83. W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, Discussion Paper No. 473 at 8-9
and Table 2, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business (Apr. 2004), http://www
.law.harvard.edu/ programs/olinscenter/papers/pdf/473.pdf (last accessed June 25, 2015) (At the time of
Mississippi's cap on punitive damages, Mississippi was considered a venue "sympathetic to plaintiffs"
and was one of "the leading punitive damages awards states.").
84. 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (awarding $2 million punitive in damages for failing to disclose that an
automobile had been repainted was grossly excessive and violated due process).
85. Id. at 568, 611.
86. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, 2002 Miss. Laws 3rd Ex. Sess. Ch. 4 (H.B. 19) (adopting caps in
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(3)(a)).
87. CIVIL PROCEDURE-TORT REFORM-VENUE; DAMAGES; JURIES, ETC., 2004
Miss. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. Ch. 1 (H.B. 13).
88. Clark, supra n.1 at 388.
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reform efforts left medical malpractice caps unchanged but enacted a $1
million noneconomic damage cap for all other claims.9'
For the most part, Mississippi's two categories of statutory
noneconomic damage caps have been consistently applied since their en-
actment92 even though a few Mississippi trial courts have found their appli-
cation to be unconstitutional.93 The Fifth Circuit in its March 2013
Learmonth opinion upheld Mississippi's caps.94 But as discussed more fully
below, since no Mississippi appellate court has directly addressed the issue,
litigants have continued to challenge the constitutionality of Mississippi's
noneconomic damage caps.
IV. THE REMAINING CHALLENGE 10 YEARS LATER: NONECONOMIC
DAMAGE CAPS IN THE SPOTLIGHT
Although there appears to no longer be any serious dispute that the
tort reform measures discussed above are fair and have brought beneficial
and needed reforms to Mississippi's civil justice system,95 one reform con-
tinues to receive scrutiny-caps on noneconomic damages established
under section 11-1-60.
Mississippi's noneconomic damage caps are not unique. At least
thirty-nine states have enacted such damage caps.96 Nearly all of them
have been challenged at some point, but the majority of state statutory caps
have been upheld.97
The Mississippi Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the con-
stitutionality of the cap on noneconomic damages in a case in which that
91. CIVIL PROCEDURE-TORT REFORM-VENUE; DAMAGES; JURIES, ETC., 2004
Miss. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. Ch. 1 (H.B. 13).
92. Double Quick, Inc. v. Lymas, 50 So. 3d 292, 293 (Miss. 2011) (trial court reduced
noneconomic damages to $1million pursuant to section 11-1-60); Bailey Lumber & Supply Co. v.
Robinson, 98 So. 3d 986, 990 (Miss. 2012) (same); see also Clemons v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-209-
CWR-FKB, 2013 WL 3943494 at *2, *11 (S.D. Miss. June 13, 2013), appeal dismissed (Aug. 21, 2013)
(applying $500,000 cap to medical malpractice claim).
93. Tanner v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., No. 111-0013, slip op. at 10, 2012 WL 7748580 (Jasper Cnty.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2012) (declaring Section 11-1-60 unconstitutional); Carter v. Interstate Realty Mgmt.
Co., No. 14-CI-09-0019, slip op. at 5-6 (Coahoma Cnty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (same); but see
Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 263 (5th Cir. 2013) ("We first observe that other
Mississippi trial courts do not share the Carter court's view.") (citing Bryant ex rel. Bryant v. McCarty,
Cause No. CV2006-0261CD (DeSoto Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 27, 2009); Lymas v. Double Quick, Inc., Civ.
No. 2007-0072 (Humphreys Cnty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 2008)).
94. Learmonth, 710 F.3d at 249.
95. Audio Recording: Ten Years Later: The Effects of Tort Reform in Mississippi, held by the
Mississippi College Law Review (Mar. 20 2015) (on file with author).
96. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *2 (citing David F. Maron, Statutory Damage Caps: Analysis
of the Scope of Right to Jury Trial and the Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on
Noneconomic Damages, 32 Miss. C.L. Rev. 109, 110 (2013) ("In all, some thirty-nine states enacted caps
on noneconomic damages. In nineteen states, courts have upheld the statutes; courts in nine states have
struck them down, and eleven states have statutory caps that have never been challenged. Of those
eleven, two have statutes which were previously struck down but then reenacted.").
97. See id. After the Clemons opinion and cited article were authored, another state struck down
its statutory damage cap. See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014). The major-
ity of states, however, still uphold them.
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issue was squarely presented.9 8 In 2012, the issue reached the Fifth Circuit
after the caps were upheld by the Southern District of Mississippi. Ulti-
mately,99 the Fifth Circuit, in a thorough and well-grounded opinion, af-
firmed the district court's holding that the caps were constitutional.
Less than a year later, another Mississippi federal court had the oppor-
tunity to address the constitutionality of the lesser caps for medical mal-
practice actions. District Court Judge Carlton Reeves, while expressing
deep concerns about the impact of caps in certain cases,100 held that the
plaintiff had not met its heavy burden of proving that they were
unconstitutional.10 1
Notwithstanding the consecutive federal opinions upholding Missis-
sippi's statutory caps on noneconomic damages, because no Mississippi ap-
pellate court has directly decided the issue, their constitutionality continues
to be challenged. A few Mississippi trial courts have held them to be un-
constitutional,0 2 but to date, those cases have settled or been dismissed
prior to a ruling from an appellate court. In the past year, three cases have
had the opportunity to go before a Mississippi appellate court on the issue.
One involved a dispute over the timing of the application of the damages
cap, but apparently was not appealed.0 3 Another presumably settled and
98. See Estate of Klaus v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, 972 So. 2d 555, 556 (Miss. 2007) (refusing
to look beyond the plain language of the statute in order to redress "the potential unintended conse-
quences of the legislative act").
99. Because the constitutionality of the caps is governed by state law, the Fifth Circuit certified
the question to the Mississippi Supreme court, Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 740
(5th Cir. 2011), who initially accepted. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Learmonth, 95 So. 3d 633 (Miss.
2012). But after reviewing the jury verdict, the Mississippi Supreme Court could not determine what
portion of the $4 million jury verdict was attributable to noneconomic damages (it was a general ver-
dict). Id. at 637. Thus, the Mississippi Supreme Court declined to answer the question. Id. The Fifth
Circuit therefore had to make an Erie-guess about whether the caps were constitutional under Missis-
sippi. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 255-57 (5th Cir. 2013). It found that they
were. Id. at 267.
100. Judge Reeves explained how the cap's application under the unique circumstances of this
case prevented full recovery by the plaintiffs and also allowed the government o escape penalties:
[T]he Court will take a moment to explain just how discriminatory the application of the
statutory cap is in this case.... [A]pplication of the cap reduces Tiara and Aubrey Anna's own
pain and suffering below that amount shown by the evidence. It then values Elona, Keontray,
and Kathy Clemons' losses at $0. This is an absurd result because the value of having a
mother, sister, and child is greater than $0. No reasonable fact-finder could assess the loss to
the Clemons family at $0, no matter how intangible and subjective loss is. [Furthermore],
punitive damages are not permitted in this case because the defendant is the government.
That is unfortunate, since there was strong evidence in this case showing that the government
knew of but failed to act upon very serious deficiencies with the quality of the physicians and
the medical equipment at the facility where Tiara and Aubrey Anna were treated.
Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *14.
101. Id. ("The undersigned obviously believes that § 11-1-60(2)(a) has a discriminatory effect as to
the plaintiff and her family, leaving them without adequate remedy for their very real, serious injuries.
And there may be doubts as to the correctness of the legislature's ostensible belief that capping non-
economic damages lowers medical malpractice premiums. . . But that is not enough. Doubts require
upholding the statutory provision, and it cannot be said that the plaintiff has proven beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that there is no possible rational basis for the legislature's action.").
102. Tanner v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., No. 111-0013, 2012 WL 7748580 (Jasper Cty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 22,
2012) (declaring section 11-1-60 unconstitutional); Carter v. Interstate Realty Mgmt. Co., No. 14-CI-09-
0019, slip op. at 5-6 (Coahoma Cty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2012) (same).
103. Walls v. Williams-Pyro, Inc., Cause No. 251-13-126CIV (Cir. Ct. Hinds Cty. Oct. 7, 2014).
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was dismissed on March 12, 2015.14 And a third challenge, Brooks v.
Glover, remains pending.
On March 9, 2015, the plaintiff in Brooks v. Glover filed a cross-appeal
with the Mississippi Court of Appeals challenging the constitutionality of
section 11-1-60.105 But as the Mississippi Attorney General's appellate
brief clearly states, neither the arguments presented in Glover, nor the ar-
guments presented in similar constitutional challenges from around the
country, can satisfy a plaintiff's heavy burden of proving section 11-1-60 is
unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt.
10 6
A. Standard of Review for Constitutional Challenges
There is a "strong presumption" that legislation is constitutional.1 7 To
overcome this presumption, the party challenging a statute must prove that
the statute is unconstitutional "beyond a reasonable doubt."'08 Consistent
with the legislature's plenary authority to establish public policy for the
state, the judiciary is prohibited from substituting its own judgment when
conducting a constitutional analysis:
In determining whether an act of the Legislature violates
the Constitution, the Courts are without the right to substi-
tute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wis-
dom and policy of the act and must enforce it, unless it
appears beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Consti-
tution. Nor are the courts at liberty to declare an Act (of
the legislature) void, because in their opinion it is opposed
to a spirit supposed to pervade the Constitution, but not ex-
pressed in words.'0 9
When conducting judicial review, a court should keep in mind that
"the challenged act has been passed by legislators and approved by a gov-
ernor sworn to uphold the selfsame constitution as we are."'110 "All doubts
must be resolved in favor of validity of a statute.""'
Furthermore, in a due process or equal protection analysis, the level of
scrutiny must be determined. If a statute implicates a "suspect class" or
infringes upon a "fundamental right," it is subject to strict scrutiny.12 But
104. Interstate Realty Mgmt. Co. v. Carter, No. 2013-CA-00420-SCT (Mar. 12, 2015).
105. Brief of Appellee at 41-50, Brooks v. Glover, 2013-CA-00052-COA. (2015) (No. 251-11-
716CIV).
106. Brief of Attorney General at 6, Brooks v. Glover, 2013-CA-00052-COA. (2015) (No. 251-11-
716CIV).
107. Cities of Oxford, Carthage, Starkville and Tupelo v. Ne. Elec. Power Ass'n, 704 So. 2d 59, 65
(Miss. 1997).
108. Pascagoula Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598, 603 (Miss. 2012); Hemba v. Miss. Dep't of
Corr., 998 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 2009); Oxford Asset Partners, LLC v. City of Oxford, 970 So. 2d 116,
120 (Miss. 2007); PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Miss. 2004).
109. Pathfinder Coach Div. of Superior Coach Corp. v. Cottrell, 62 So. 2d 383, 385 (Miss. 1953).
110. State v. Roderick, 704 So. 2d 49, 52 (Miss. 1997).
111. PHE, Inc., 877 So. 2d at 1247.
112. Wells by Wells v. Panola Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 645 So. 2d 883, 893 (Miss. 1994).
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if neither of these are present, a statute is subjected to the less rigorous
rational basis review.1 3 Under rational basis review, a law need only be
"rationally or reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose."'1 14 Laws
subject to rational basis review are almost always upheld even if the legisla-
ture does not select the best method to accomplish its stated goal.11 5 So the
level of scrutiny tends to be dispositive under that standard.'
1 6
In reviewing challenges to noneconomic damage caps, the clear major-
ity of courts have applied rational basis review, finding that those laws did
not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class.1 17 A few states have
applied a higher level of scrutiny,'1 8 and the recent trend of litigants is to
argue that strict scrutiny applies."9 Some trial courts have agreed.1 20 But
as discussed below-and as recognized by the majority of courts-rational
basis review, not strict scrutiny, remains the correct standard.
1. There is no "fundamental right" to full recovery.
There are a number of recognized fundamental rights, but the right to
a full recovery in tort is not one of them. Indeed, many state courts have
affirmatively recognized as much.1 2' Since a plaintiff's interest in tort re-
covery is economic, it is only entitled to rational basis review.12 2 The mi-
nority of jurisdictions that recognize a full recovery as a fundamental right
do so because of provisions in their state constitutions specifically guaran-
teeing that the amount of recovery shall not be limited.1 23 Courts have
held that the absence of such a provision establishes that "full recovery" is
113. Id.; Justus v. State, 750 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Westbrook v. City of
Jackson, 665 So. 2d 833, 838 (Miss. 1995); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993)).
114. Wells, 645 So. 2d at 893; U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980).
115. See Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1991).
116. Carly N. Kelly, & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitutional?
An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED & ETHICS 515, 522 (Fall 2005).
117. Id.
118. Id.; see, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assoc., 592 So. 2d 156, 167-69 (Ala. 1991) (implicitly
applying a heightened standard of review when it considered empirical studies in determining whether
Alabama's cap on noneconomic damages served its intended purpose).
119. Brief of Appellee at 42, Brooks v. Glover, 2013-CA-00052-COA. (2015) (No. 251-11-
716CIV).; Clemons v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-209-CWR-FKB, 2013 WL 3943494 at *8-9 (S.D.
Miss. June 13, 2013), appeal dismissed (Aug. 21, 2013) (court rejected plaintiff's argument that strict
scrutiny applied).
120. See Memorandum and Order at 9-10, Clark v. Cain, et al., Docket No. 12-C-1147 (Hamilton
Cty. Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2015). The trial court in Clark believed that Tennessee's noneconomic damage
caps infringed upon a plaintiff's right to a jury trial. Id. at 9-10. Believing the right to a jury trial was
akin to the fundamental right to privacy, the trial court applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 4 (citing Planned
Parenthood v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000)).
121. See, e.g., Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 493 (Mont. 1989) ("[O]ur remedy guar-
antee does not create a fundamental right to full legal redress." This is in accord with another Montana
rule: "No one has a vested right to any rule of common law."); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376
S.E.2d 525, 531 (Va. 1989) ("[A] party has no fundamental right to a particular remedy or a full recov-
ery in tort."); Stuart v. City of Morgan City, 504 So. 2d 934, 941 (La. Ct. App. 1987) ("[A] victim's right
to sue in tort for full recovery for an injury is not a fundamental right.").
122. Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1120 (Kan. 2012) (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env.
Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978)).
123. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XVIII, § 6 ("The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall
never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.").
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not a fundamental right.124  Not only does Mississippi's constitution not
contain such a provision, but also the Mississippi Supreme Court has itself
refused to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to statutes limiting recovery
of damages.
125
2. Tort Plaintiffs are not a "suspect class."
Damage caps have been challenged on the basis that they treat differ-
ent groups of plaintiffs or defendants differently.126 Basically, challengers
have claimed that making a distinction between plaintiffs based on the type
or severity of their injuries violates equal protection guarantees. But Mis-
sissippi law is clear: "[p]arties injured by ... tortfeasors, are not a 'suspect
class.' "127 Other jurisdictions agree.
128
In sum, because there is no fundamental right to a full recovery and
because tort victims are not a suspect class, a constitutional challenge to
section 11-1-60 should be analyzed under rational basis review.
129
B. Constitutional Challenges to Section 11-1-60.
The seminal case addressing the constitutionality of section 11-1-60 is
Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'3 ° In Learmonth, the Fifth Circuit's
Erie-decision upheld Mississippi's $1 million noneconomic damage cap
against challenges based on right to jury trial and separation of powers
challenges.1 ' Not long after Learmonth, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi addressed the constitutionality of
124. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 787 (W.D. Va. 1986) affd in part, rev'd in part and question
certified, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989), certified question answered, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990) and
amended, 678 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1988) ("[A]lthough the constitutions of certain states specifically
prohibit limitations upon recovery in personal injury actions, see, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 18 § 6, the
Virginia Constitution contains no such provision. Thus, the right to a full recovery in tort is not a
fundamental right under the Virginia Constitution.").
125. Wells by Wells v. Panola Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 645 So. 2d 883, 896 (Miss. 1994) ("Parties in-
jured by government tortfeasors, or by any tortfeasor, are not a 'suspect class.' There is no fundamental
right to sue the government for damages.").
126. Equal protection challenges to damage caps have been based on one or more of three alleged
"suspect classes": (1) medical malpractice plaintiffs versus all others; (2) defendants sued for medical
negligence versus all other tort defendants; and (3) plaintiffs with injuries below the cap, which receive
full recovery, versus plaintiffs with injuries above the cap which do not. Kelly and Mello, supra note 116
at 522.
127. Wells, 645 So. 2d at 896.
128. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1071 (Ill. 1997) (establishing rational basis
test for classifications involving tort victims); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 111 (Md. 1992)
(same); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 534 (Va. 1989) (same); but see Mary Ann Willis,
Comment, Limitation on Recovery of Damages Medical Malpractice Cases: A Violation of Equal Protec-
tion?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1329, 1350-51 (1986) (advocating intermediate scrutiny for classifications
disadvantaging tort victims).
129. The United States District Court of the Southern District of Mississippi has recently held that
even Section 11-1-60(2)(a)'s lesser cap in medical malpractice cases does not interfere with a fundamen-
tal right of disadvantage a suspect class. Clemons v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-209-CWR-FKB, 2013
WL 3943494, *9 (S.D. Miss. June 13, 2013), appeal dismissed (Aug. 21, 2013) (citing Ford Motor Co.,
264 F .3d at 510; Wells, 645 So. 2d at 896).
130. 710 F.3d 249, 267 (5th Cir. 2013).
131. Id. (upholding Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(2)(b) (1972)).
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Mississippi's cap on noneconomic damages in medical practice cases.13 2 As
discussed above, while voicing disapproval of the effect the damage caps
had on the plaintiff in that particular case,33 the court nevertheless found
the caps constitutional against special legislation, due process, equal pro-
tection, and takings clause challenges, concluding that "it cannot be said
that the plaintiff has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no
possible rational basis for the legislature's action.'
'1 34
Over the course of the following year and a half, Mississippi plaintiffs
continued to challenge the constitutionality of section 11-1-60.131 One of
those challenges, Brooks v. Glover, is pending. The plaintiff in Glover filed
a cross-appeal136 challenging the constitutionality of section 11-1-60137 on
the following grounds:
Miss. Const., art. III § 24 Open Courts; remedy for injury;
Miss. Const., art. III § 25 Access to courts;
Miss. Const., art. III § 31 Trial by jury;
Miss. Const., art. III §§ 1-2 Separation of Powers; and
Miss. Const., art. IV § 87 Special or local laws.
138
Because the Glover appeal is pending as of the writing of this Article,
whether or how the court will reach the issue remains to be seen.
139
The following subsections in this Article analyze constitutional chal-
lenges that have been or could be made against section 11-1-60. Consistent
with the majority of other states, section 11-1-60 should be upheld under
any constitutional challenge.
132. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *9 (upholding Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(2)(a)).
133. Id. at *12-14.
134. Id. at *14.
135. See supra n.103-104 and accompanying text.
136. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court typically hears constitutional issues and issues of
first impression, the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals before the appellees filed a cross-appeal
challenging the constitutionality of Section 11-1-60. Once a case has been assigned, "'neither the Court
of Appeals nor any party may file any pleading or certification seeking reassignment." Miss. R. App. P.
16(e). Appellees nevertheless filed a motion to challenge the assignment, which was denied.
137. Brief of Appellee at 41-50, Brooks v. Glover, 2013-CA-00052-COA. (2015) (No. 251-11-
716CIV).
138. Id.
139. If the Court of Appeals decides the primary appeal in the appellants' favor and reverses the
underlying judgment, the constitutional challenge should be mooted. Reply Brief of Appellant at 20,
Brooks v. Glover, 2013-CA-00052-COA (2015) (No. 251-11-716CIV) (citing Manhattan Nursing &
Rehab. v. Pace, 134 So. 3d 810, 817 (91 23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) ("'Courts have a solemn duty to avoid
passing upon the constitutionality of any law unless compelled to do so by an issue squarely presented
to and confronting a court in a particular case."') (quoting State v. Watkins, 676 So. 2d 247, 149 (Miss.




1. Right to Jury Trial.
Perhaps the most often-cited basis for challenging noneconomic dam-
age caps is that it infringes upon a plaintiff's constitutional right to a trial by
jury. "There are essentially two lines of cases addressing whether a cap on
damages deprives a victim of the right to a jury trial."' 4 ° "One position is
that the jury's right to determine damages extends not only to a factual
assessment of their amount, but also to an actual award of those dam-
ages."14' "The other position... notes that although a party has the right
to have a jury assess his damages, he has no right to have a jury dictate
through an award the legal consequences of its assessment.'1 42 The major-
ity of states have subscribed to the latter view, as did the Fifth Circuit in
Learmonth.
143
As the Fifth Circuit correctly noted, the first step in the constitutional
analysis is to place the issue in the framework of Mississippi law, which
"distinguishes between a jury's verdict and a court's judgment."'44 The dis-
tinction between a verdict and award can be seen in both the mechanics of
Mississippi's Rules of Civil Procedure,'4 5 as well as its earliest laws of rem-
edies.'46 A "verdict" or "award" is "a purely factual finding with respect to
compensatory damages," whereas a "judgment" is "an act whereby the law
that applies to the facts at bar is given effect."'4 7 Placing section 11-1-
60(2)(b) into this framework, the Fifth Circuit concluded that section could
"be interpreted not o alter a jury's factual damages determination, but
instead to impose a strictly legal limitation on the judgment that provides
the remedy for a noneconomic injury."'4 8
After establishing the mentary damage caps, Section 11-1-60 provides
that the "trier of fact shall not be advised of the limitations imposed by this
140. Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 144 (Utah 2004).
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989)).
143. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 710 F.3d 249, 259-61 (5th Cir. 2013).
144. Id. at 259.
145. Id. (citing Miss. R. Civ. P. 54, advisory committee's note) ("The terms 'decision' and 'judg-
ment' are not synonymous under these rules. The decision consists of the court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law; the rendition of judgment is the pronouncement of that decision and the act that
gives it legal effect.").
146. Id. (citing Lewis v. Garrett's Adm'rs, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 434, 455 (1841) ("[Wlhether the
court pronounces the judgment of the law upon facts found by the jury in cases where a trial by jury is
required, or upon facts ascertained in other modes when they are permitted, the judgment is still the
award of law."); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396 ("The judgment, in short, is the rem-
edy prescribed by law for the redress of injuries."); Stanford Young, Mississippi Trial Handbook § 37:1
(3d ed. 2012) ("[A] judgment is the conclusion of the law upon the matters contained in the record.")).
147. Learmonth, 710 F.3d at 259 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Learmonth, 95 So. 3d 633, 639
(Miss. 2012) (the amount of noneconomic damages is "an essential, contested, requisite fact" (emphasis
added)); City of Jackson v. Locklar, 431 So. 2d 475, 481 (Miss. 1983) ("The jury's [damages] verdict is a
finding of fact."); Nichols v. Daniels, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 224, 224 (1826) (in a court of law, a judge
"pronounce[s] the law arising upon the facts found by the jury"); cf Oakes v. State, 54 So. 79, 80 (Miss.
1910) (a verdict as to liability reflects a mixed question of law and fact)).
148. Learmonth, 710 F.3d at 260.
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subsection. "149 The jury remains free to fulfill its fact-finding role un-
hampered. Only then, after the jury has made its finding, "the judge shall
appropriately reduce any award of noneconomic damages that exceeds the
applicable limitation."'50 Section 11-1-60 thus permits the jury to deter-
mine the facts and the judge to thereafter apply the law.'5' Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit held that the Mississippi legislature "has not invaded the
jury's fact-finding role in enacting § 11-1-60(2)(b). '152
The plaintiff in Glover raised essentially the same right to jury trial
challenge before the Mississippi Court of Appeals.153 If the Court of Ap-
peals applies Learmonth's thorough analysis, section 11-1-60 will be
upheld.54
2. Separation of Powers
Like the federal and most state constitutions, the Mississippi Constitu-
tion contains a separation of powers clause.155  Applying separation of
powers, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "the judicial branch
should not engage in policy decisions'1 56 and courts "are without the right
to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to [a statute's]
wisdom and policy.'
' 57
In Learmonth, the plaintiff argued that section 11-1-60(2)(b) violated
separation of powers for two reasons.'5 8 First, she argued that the damage
caps interfered with the judicial procedure of remittitur. 59 Second, she
claimed section 11-1-60(2)(b) was facially invalid as a legislatively promul-
gates rule of judicial procedure.160 The Fifth Circuit squarely rejected
these arguments.1 61 The plaintiff in Glover pursued a separation of powers
149. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-60(c) (1972).
150. Id.
151. Learmonth, 710 F.3d at 260 (citing Natchez & S.R.R. Co. v. Crawford, 55 So. 596, 598 (Miss.
1911) ("[T]he common-law jury, guaranteed by section 31, is a jury with power alone to try issues of
fact, and not of law."); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Wallace, 43 So. 469, 470-71 (Miss. 1907) ("trial
by jury" means "in court under the forms of law, with a judge presiding to direct the proceedings in
conformity with it"); Commercial Bank of Rodney v. State, 12 Miss. (4 S. & M.) 439, 515 (1845)
(Sharkey, C.J., dissenting) ("The law defines rights and provides remedies, but it is for the judiciary to
construe the law in its application to the objects of its provisions, and to enforce the remedy."); 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 146 at *116 (the victim of a legal wrong "acquire[s] an incomplete or inchoate
right [to damages], the instant he receives the injury; though such right be not fully ascertained till they
are assessed by the intervention of the law") (footnote omitted).
152. Learmonth, 710 F.3d at 261.
153. Brief for Appellee at 43-46, Brooks v. Glover, 2013-CA-00052-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
154. For a more detailed analysis of jury trial challenges to noneconomic damage caps in Missis-
sippi and other states, see David Maron, Statutory Damage Caps: Analysis of the Scope of Right to Jury
Trial and the Constitutionality of Mississippi Statutory Caps on Noneconomic Damages, 32 Miss. C.L.
Rev. 109, 112-19 (2013).
155. Miss. CONST. art. I, § 2
156. Limbert v. Miss. Univ. for Women Alumnae Ass'n, 998 So. 2d 993, 1000 (Miss. 2008).
157. Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799, 803 (Miss. 1938).
158. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 264-266 (5th Cir. 2013).
159. Id. at 264-65.
160. Id. at 265-66.
161. Id.
A DECADE EXAMINED
challenge for substantially the same reasons.162 For the reasons discussed
in Learmonth, the challenges in Glover should be unsuccessful under con-
trolling law as well.
163
Plaintiffs' choice to raise separation of powers arguments is interesting
because it is a two-edged sword. Just as a legislature should not overstep
its bounds into the province of the judiciary, the judiciary must likewise
refuse to undertake the policy-setting role of the legislature.164  "[I]n a
democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the
will and consequently the moral values of the people.' 165 "Courts are with-
out the right to substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to
the wisdom and policy of the act and must enforce it, unless it appears
beyond all reasonable doubt to violate the Constitution.' 166 "All doubts
must be resolved in favor of validity of a statute.'
'1 67
A clear example of this is Clemons v. United States.68 Though expres-
sing some doubt and deep concerns regarding the application of Missis-
sippi's caps on noneconomic damages to the facts of a case involving
serious injuries, the court declined to "substitute [its] judgment" for that of
the legislature:
[T]here may be doubts as to the correctness of the legislature's ostensi-
ble belief that capping non-economic damages lowers medical malpractice
premiums; the parties presented no evidence on that point either way. But
that is not enough. Doubts require upholding the statutory provision, and it
cannot be said that the plaintiff has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
there is no possible rational basis for the legislature's action.69
Likewise, the Mississippi Supreme Court has also declined to find sec-
tion 11-1-60(2)(a) facially unconstitutional.7 ° It concluded that "to prop-
erly preserve the separation of powers mandated by the Mississippi
Constitution, this Court should act with restraint."''
There are times, however, when courts substitute their opinion for that
of the legislature. A trial court in Tennessee recently declared Tennessee's
noneconomic damage cap unconstitutional. In doing so, that court improp-
erly considered not only the "social justification for the legislation ... but
162. Brief for Appellee at 46-60, Brooks v. Glover, 2013-CA-00052-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
163. For a more detailed analysis of separation of power challenges to noneconomic damage caps
in Mississippi and other states, see Maron, supra note 154, at 120-123.
164. Jones v. City of Ridgeland, 48 So. 3d 530, 536 (Miss. 2010) ("We also must be cautious not to
encroach on the constitutional powers belonging to the Legislature.").
165. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1024 (Miss. 2004) (citation omitted).
166. Pathfinder Coach Div. of Superior Coach Corp. v. Cottrell, 62 So. 2d 383, 385 (Miss. 1953).
167. PHE, Inc. v. State, 877 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Miss. 2004).
168. Clemons v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-209-CWR-FKB, 2013 WL 3943494, *14 (S.D. Miss.
June 13, 2013), appeal dismissed (Aug. 21, 2013).
169. Id. (emphasis in original).
170. Estate of Klaus v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, 972 So. 2d 555, 556 (Miss. 2007) (refusing to
look beyond the plain language of the statute in order to redress "the potential unintended conse-
quences of the legislative act").
171. Id.
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also the factual basis for that social justification. 17 2 Although citing a
thirty-five year old case which prohibited "independently examin[ing] the
factual basis for the legislative justification for the statute," the trial court
nevertheless did the opposite-it examined and re-weighed the factual ba-
sis for the legislature's justification.173 This account is not isolated. In fact,
most courts that have declared noneconomic damage caps unconstitutional
have done so after re-examining and re-weighing the policy and data un-
derlying the legislature's deliberative decision.
17 4
When a court examines whether it believes that there is sufficient data
to support a legislative decision, it must re-weigh numerous (and compet-
ing) studies that purport to show that damage caps have served their in-
tended purpose and vice versa.'7 5 Thus, when such courts go beyond
judicial review and re-weigh the legislative process, they necessarily substi-
tute their views for that of the broader deliberative legislative process, a
process that is precisely designed address and weigh such policy issues.76
Mississippi's long-standing jurisprudence prohibits this encroachment.1
77
The Mississippi Supreme Court has emphasized that courts "have no con-
stituency.' 78  Instead, they "have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do," and the "responsibilities for assessing the
wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between compet-
ing views of the public interest are not judicial ones.'1 79  Tellingly, "the
people" do not always favor abolition of noneconomic damage caps or
even an increase in their amounts. For instance, in November 2014, Cali-
fornia voters were asked to decide whether to raise the state's $250,000
172. Memorandum and Order at 16, Clark v. Cain, et al., Docket No. 12-C-1147 (Hamilton Cnty.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2015).
173. Id. at 16-17 (citing Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (N.H. 1980) overruled by Cmty. Res.
for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707 (N.H. 2007)).
174. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 168 (Ala. 1991) ("The correlation
between the damages cap ... and the reduction of health care costs ... is, at best, indirect and re-
mote."); Carson v. Mewer, 120 N.H. 925 (1980) ("The necessary relationship between the legislative
goal of rate reduction and the means chosen to attain that goal is weak at best."); State v. Sheward, 715
N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) ("[U]nable to find ... any evidence between the proposition that there is a
rational connection between awards over $200,000 and malpractice insurance rates."); see also Watts v.
Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 649 (Mo. 2012) (Russell, J., dissenting) (calling majority's
decision to overrule twenty years of precedent by declaring Missouri's cap on noneconomic damage
unconstitutional, results oriented).
175. Compare The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence from the States, A Congressional Budget
Office Paper, at vii (June 2004) ("The most consistent finding in the studies that CBO reviewed was
that caps on damage awards reduced the number of lawsuits filed, the value of awards, and insurance
costs."), http://www.cbo.gov/ sites/default/files/report_2.pdf (last accessed June 25, 2015), with De-
bunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises Behind "Tort Reform," 5 YALE J.
HEALTH PoL'Y L. & ETmics 357, 363-69 (2005) (arguing that caps do little to address the rising costs of
health care and medical malpractice insurance and that one way to address those concerns is to have
"stronger regulation of the insurance industry").
176. Chase v. State, 873 So. 2d 1013, 1024 (Miss. 2004) (citations omitted).
177. See supra, n.165-167 and accompanying text.
178. Barbour v. State ex rel. Hood, 974 So. 2d 232, 243 (Miss. 2008) (quoting Chevron USA, Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)).
179. Id. at 243 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866) (emphasis added).
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limit on noneconomic damages in medical liability cases to $1.1 million. 8 °
California voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposal two to one.
181
3. Due Process
While the plaintiff in Learmonth failed to preserve certain arguments
on appeal, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless noted the possibility that "the Mis-
sissippi Constitution's Due Process Clause ... might impose substantive
constraints on the legislature's authority to cap compensatory damages.
182
The plaintiff in Clemons asserted a due process challenge to section 11-1-
60.183
a. Procedural Due Process
A procedural due process challenge to legislative, noneconomic dam-
age caps rests on the premise that a plaintiff has a vested property interest
in whatever damages award a jury delivers and that imposition of any statu-
tory damage cap deprives them of this full amount without an opportunity
to present evidence as to why the full award amount is justified.
These arguments have been unsuccessful. For example, in Etheridge
vs. Medical Center Hospitals, the plaintiff argued that Virginia's $750,000
damage cap deprived her of an effective opportunity to be heard since the
damage cap "preordain[ed] the result of the hearing" and created "a con-
clusive presumption that no plaintiff's damages exceed $750,000.' 184 The
Virginia court, however, rejected that argument.'85 The district court in
Clemons rejected a similar procedural due process argument because
"[t]here ha[d] been a substantial amount of process offered by the proceed-
ings in this Court, during which the plaintiff was well-represented and ar-
gued every one of her theories of recovery and unconstitutionality.'18 6 In
fact, procedural due process arguments on this issue have never been
successful.'8 7
180. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Building on the Foundation: Mississippi's Tort Re-
form Success and a Path Forward, - Miss. C.L. REV. - (2015).
181. Id. (citing Cal. Sec. of State, Ballot Measures by County (Dec. 10, 2014) (reporting that
66.8% of voters said "no" to Proposition 46), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-generallpdf/88-
ballot-measures.pdf).
182. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 266 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Miss. CONST.
ART. III, §§ 14, 24).
183. Clemons v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-209-CWR-FKB, 2013 WL 3943494 at *8-15 (S.D.
Miss. June 13, 2013), appeal dismissed (Aug. 21, 2013).
184. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Va. 1989).
185. Id.
186. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *15
187. A compiled analysis of damage cap challenges concluded: "The procedural due process the-
ory has never been successfully used to defeat damages caps legislation in any federal or state court."
Kelly & Mello, supra note 116, at 523; see also Nicholas T. Timm, From Damages Caps to Health
Courts: Continuing Progress in Medical Malpractice Reform, 2010 MICH. ST. L. Rev. 1209, 1228 (2010)
(arguing that alternative tort reforms such as health courts would not violate procedural due process
"because non-economic damages caps do not violate procedural due process"). The most recent high
court cases addressing the constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps have not even considered
procedural due process challenges. See, e.g., Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo.
2012), reh'g denied (Sept. 25, 2012); Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098 (Kan. 2012); MacDonald v. City
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b. Substantive Due Process
To succeed on a substantive due process challenge, a plaintiff must
prove both that he or she has a protected property interest under Missis-
sippi law and that the government's limitation on his or her right is not
rationally related188 to a legitimate governmental interest.189 Furthermore,
the court should consider the social and economic conditions that existed
when the statute was enacted or at the time the case was decided.190 Mis-
sissippi "laws will not be invalidated under the due process or equal protec-
tion clauses unless they are manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable for the
classifications. " 191
The first problem with a substantive due process challenge to section
11-1-60 is that "although a party has the right to have a jury assess his
damages, he has no right to have a jury dictate through an award the legal
consequences of its assessment."'192 Section 11-1-60 allows the jury to as-
sess damages unimpeded. And, only after the jury has made its decision,
does the court apply the statutory limitation on damages.193 Thus, section
11-1-60 does not invade a protected property interest under Mississippi
law.
The second, and perhaps higher, hurdle that a plaintiff must overcome
is to show that section 11-1-60 is not rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest. Section 11-1-60 was enacted in the midst of a climate that
had earned Mississippi national notoriety as a "judicial hellhole.'1 94 States
across the country have similarly upheld noneconomic damage caps that
were intended to combat "social or economic evils," such as excessive jury
verdicts, rising health insurance premiums and a corresponding increase in
healthcare costs.19 5 There can be no doubt that the Mississippi legislature
was trying to address the identical problems. While there may be policy
debate about whether noneconomic damages caps were the best method to
curb these problems and whether the caps had their intended effect, courts
are not allowed to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature
and any doubts should be construed in favor of upholding the statute.
196
Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 2011); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d
218 (Ga. 2010).
188. As discussed in Section IV. A. supra, and accompanying text, rational basis review should
apply to a due process challenge to section 11-1-60. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi has applied this very standard when analyzing whether section 11-1-60 violated
due process. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *14.
189. Id. (citing Simi Inv. Co., Inc. v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 236 F.3d 240, 250-51 (5th Cir. 2000)).
190. Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799, 804-05 (Miss. 1938).
191. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *9 (quoting Miss. Bd. of Nursing v. Belk, 481 So. 2d 826, 830
(Miss. 1985)).
192. Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 144 (Utah 2004) (quoting Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376
S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989)); see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. American Tort Reform Foundation, Judicial Hellholes (2004), http://www.atra.org/news-
room/worst-states-liability-systems-are-home-judicial-hellholes%C2%AE (last accessed June 25, 2015).
195. Judd, 103 P.3d at 139.
196. See supra n.164-167 and accompanying text.
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Under this deferential standard, recent substantive due process challenges
to section 11-1-60 have not succeeded.'
97
The last remaining substantive due process argument is the statutory
amount-that the caps are too low. 198 In other words, while the legislature
can lawfully limit recoverable noneconomic damages, a cap of one dollar
may be unreasonable or arbitrary.'99 This argument should not prove per-
suasive in Mississippi. Section 11-1-60 caps noneconomic damages for
medical malpractice at $500,000 and all other claims at $1 million.2 ' This
is well above the national average.a ' Since 2011, the supreme courts in
two other states have upheld statutory noneconomic damage caps of
$250,000202 -an amount far lower than Mississippi's caps. And in at least
one other state, voters declined to increase their $250,000 noneconomic
damage cap.2 °3
4. Equal Protection
"Mississippi's constitution has no equal protection clause."204 Even
so, an equal protection challenge under the United State's Constitution
should be unsuccessful because due process and equal protection chal-
lenges are usually reviewed under the same rational basis standard dis-
cussed in Section IV. B. 3. of this Article. Accordingly, many courts
dispense with both questions in the same analysis.205 As discussed supra,
the Mississippi legislature had a rational basis in enacting section 11-1-
60.206
197. Clemons v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-209-CWR-FKB, 2013 WL 3943494 at *15 (S.D. Miss.
June 13, 2013), appeal dismissed, (Aug. 21, 2013) ("[P]laintiff's substantive due process challenge fails
for the same reason as her equal protection challenge: the State can articulate a rational basis for
limiting non-economic damages ... ").
198. While it is theoretically possible that a damage cap may be too low, Mississippi law is clear
that the legislature does not have to provide a substitute remedy when statutorily limiting a plaintiff's
recovery. See Wells by Wells v. Panola Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 645 So. 2d 883, 891-892 (Miss. 1994). Cf,
Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1114 (Kan. 2012) (requiring legislature to provide a substitute remedy
to replace the loss of a right (i.e., a quid pro quo)).
199. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 266 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that Missis-
sippi's due process clause might impose substantive constraints on the legislature's authority to cap
damages at one dollar).
200. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60(2) (1972).
201. Maron, supra n.154 at Appendix.
202. Miller, 289 P.3d at 1118; MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405, 419 (W. Va. 2011).
203. See supra n.180-181 and accompanying text.
204. Clemons v. United States, No. 4:10-CV-209-CWR-FKB, 2013 WL 3943494 at *10 (S.D. Miss.
June 13, 2013), appeal dismissed, (Aug. 21, 2013).
205. Kelly & Mello, supra note 116 at 524; see, e.g., Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1055
(Alaska 2002) (holding that the substantive due process question was dispensed with once the court
found that the damages caps did not violate equal protection guarantees); Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494
at *8-10 (applying same rational basis analysis to due process and equal protection challenges to section
11-1-60).
206. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *15 ("[P]laintiff's substantive due process challenge fails for
the same reason as her equal protection challenge: the State can articulate a rational basis for limiting
non-economic damages .... ").
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5. Special Legislation
Section 11-1-60 has also been challenged as unlawful special legisla-
tion. The argument does not challenge section 11-1-60 in its entirety;
rather, it maintains that the lesser $500,000 cap for medical injuries in sec-
tion 11-1-60(2)(a) unlawfully benefits healthcare providers and penalizes
plaintiffs who happen to be injured by healthcare providers.0 7
The Mississippi Constitution's special legislation clause, Article IV,
section 87 provides:
No special or local law shall be enacted for the benefit of
individuals or corporations, in cases which are or can be
provided for by general law, or where the relief sought can
be given by any court of this State; nor shall the operation
of any general law be suspended by the Legislature for the
benefit of any individual or private corporation or associa-
tion, and in all cases where a general law can be made appli-
cable, and would be advantageous, no special law shall be
enacted.208
Article IV, section 90 similarly provides that "[t]he legislature shall not
pass local, private, or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases,
but such matters shall be provided for only by general laws .... Regulating
the practice in courts of justice .... 209
"The purpose of such provisions is to confine the power of the legisla-
ture to the enactment of general statutes conducive to the welfare of the
state as a whole, to prevent diversity of laws on the same subject, to secure
uniformity of law throughout the state as far as possible, and to prevent the
granting of special privileges. ' 210 "A law is classified as general when it
operates uniformly on all members of a class of persons, places or things
requiring legislation peculiar to that class."'2 1' A local or private law can-
not, however, be "enacted for the benefit of 'private individuals or
corporations.' "212
Under this rubric, the Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly
struck down laws that applied only to a particular city or county. 3 It has
207. This argument is substantially similar to equal protection challenges. See supra n.126, and
accompanying text.
208. Miss. CoNsT. art. IV, § 87.
209. MIsS. CONsT. art. IV, § 90.
210. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *7 (quoting Smith v. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp., 310 So. 2d
281, 282 (Miss. 1975)).
211. Id. (quoting Sec'y of State v. Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 995 (Miss. 1994)).
212. Id. (quoting Brandon v. City of Hattiesburg, 493 So. 2d 324, 326 (Miss. 1986)).
213. Oxford Asset Partners, LLC v. City of Oxford, 970 So. 2d 116, 118-19 (Miss. 2007) (striking
down law that did not apply to the City of Oxford only); State ex rel. Pair v. Burroughs, 487 So. 2d 220,
225 (Miss. 1986) (striking down law applicable to Jones County only); Rolph v. Bd. of Trustees, 346 So.
2d 377, 379 (Miss. 1977) (striking down law applicable to Forrest County only); Smith v. Transcon. Gas




likewise voided laws applicable to particular companies.214 But laws that
affect an entire industry have not been held to be impermissible special
legislation.215  A prime example is a case involving the Mississippi bar
itself.
Under Mississippi law, only those admitted to the Mississippi bar, or
those admitted pro hac vice into a particular court, can practice law in Mis-
sissippi.216 This law clearly provides a special benefit exclusively to li-
censed attorneys.217 It also "discriminates" against both non-lawyers and
lawyers not admitted to the Mississippi bar.218 Nevertheless, since this law
is applicable to the entire legal industry, it is considered a permissible gen-
eral law.219
For the same reason, the cap in section 11-1-60(2)(a) also is a general
law.220 "The statute applies to all health care providers across the State on
equal terms .... Under Mississippi law, then, it is more akin to a general
law than special legislation, and survives [a special legislation] constitu-
tional challenge."221
6. Takings Clause
Article III, section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution prohibits "tak-
ing" property without just compensation.222 Nationally, the takings clause
has not been frequently used to challenge damage caps. But in Mississippi
the argument has been presented and rejected with one court deeming it
"'creative, but not persuasive.'"223
Takings jurisprudence almost always concerns real property where
state action has the effect of either taking or diminishing the value of the
real property (e.g., eminent domain proceedings). In Wells, the Mississippi
Supreme Court declined to invalidate the cap on damages recoverable
against parents of minor school children because it had "never construed
the [takings] clause to apply to a cause of action."224 Essentially the same
214. State v. Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co., 38 So. 732, 737 (Miss. 1905) (finding that "an express grant
of power by the Legislature for the two [railroad] companies to consolidate... would have been void"
under section 87 of the state Constitution).
215. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *7.
216. Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-55 (1972) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the
practice of law in this state who has not been licensed according to law.").
217. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *8 n.8.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at *7-8.
221. Id. at *8.
222. Miss. CONST. ART. III, § 17 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use,
except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof, in a manner to be pre-
scribed by law; and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public,
the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such, deter-
mined without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public.").
223. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *15 (quoting Wells by Wells v. Panola Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 645
So. 2d 883, 895 (Miss. 1994)).
224. Wells, 645 So. 2d at 894-895.
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argument was presented in Clemons to attack section 11-1-60(2)(a).2 25 Re-
lying on Wells, the district court determined "the plaintiff's takings chal-
lenge fails because her claim does not concern real property.
226
7. Open Court and Access to Courts
The Learmonth opinion also left the question open of whether section
11-1-60 violated the Remedy Clause of the Mississippi Constitution,227 also
known as the "Open Courts" clause, which states: "All courts shall be
open; and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person,
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay. '228 In its challenge to
section 11-1-60, the plaintiff in Glover relied upon both this section and the
related "Access to Courts" section.229
The Mississippi Supreme Court has interpreted section 24 to provide
"a reasonable right of access to the courts-a reasonable opportunity to be
heard."'23 Significantly, the right of access to courts is not "absolute," and
a litigant must "comply with legislative enactments, rules and judicial
decisions.
231
In Wells, the Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed whether a statute
that limits the amount of damages for personal injuries violates article III,
section 24.232 It concluded it did not. 33 There, the plaintiffs challenged a
statute that limited the amount of damages a school district could recover
against the parents of a minor child to $20,000.234 They claimed that this
limitation of damages destroyed the constitutional guarantee that all courts
shall provide a remedy by due course of law.235 In rejecting this argument,
the Mississippi Supreme Court held:
We need not . . . elaborate the rule that the constitution
does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition
of old ones recognized by the common law, to obtain a per-
missible legislative object .... [T]here is no vested right in
any remedy for a tort yet to happen which the Constitution
protects. Except as to vested rights, the legislative power
225. Clemons, 2013 WL 3943494 at *15.
226. Id.
227. Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 266 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Miss. CONST.
art. III, § 24).
228. Miss. CONST. art. III,§ 24.
229. Id. at § 25 ("No person shall be debarred from prosecuting or defending any civil cause for or
against him or herself, before any tribunal in the state, by him or herself, or counsel, or both.").
230. Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So. 2d 691, 697 (Miss. 2006).
231. Id.
232. 645 So. 2d 883, 890-92 (Miss. 1992).
233. Id. at 892.




exists to change or abolish existing statutory and common-
law remedies.236
In other words, the Open Courts clause provides a "fair hearing" in
accordance with the principles of due process.237 Article III, section 24
"has never been construed 'as guaranteeing limitless or absolute recovery
for injury.'"238
V. MAINTAINING THE SUCCESS OF THE REFORMS
At the beginning of the last decade one author proposed many of the
reforms discussed in this Article. He predicted that if enacted they would
"contribute to eliminating Mississippi's unfavorable business reputation,
return a sense of fairness to the state's judicial system, and increase the
state's chances of creating and attracting more and better jobs for Missis-
sippians.' 239  Around the same time, former Mississippi Supreme Court
Justice Rueben Anderson, commenting on Mississippi's then increasingly
hostile business climate, cautioned that "[t]his state simply cannot expect to
thumb its nose at national enterprise in the courtroom, while reaching out
to shake its hand in the customer line.""24 And as Dick Thornburgh noted
more than a decade ago, citizens have a significant stake in reforms at least
in three areas: "Enhancing our economic competitiveness and ensuring job
security, preserving our healthcare system and the viability of medical re-
search, and guaranteeing to all citizens a timely day in court."2 41 Indeed,
civil justice reforms were, and remain, essential to all Mississippians.
With the legislative and judicial reforms discussed in this Article, we
believe that the warnings by Justice Anderson and others have been
heeded, and tort reform measures adopted have served their purposes. But
certainly, "gains can become ground lost if [tort reform] efforts stop.
242
Policy arguments will continue on both sides of many of these tort reform
243issues. And with those healthy debates, it is important to keep in mind
236. Id.
237. Miles v. Bd. of Supervisors of Scott Cnty., 33 So. 2d 810, 814 (Miss. 1948). As discussed
supra, a procedural due process challenge has never been effectively used to invalidate a noneconomic
damage cap. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
238. Chamberlin v. City of Hernando, 716 So. 2d 596, 602 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Wells, 645 So. 2d
at 892).
239. Clark, supra n.1 at 394.
240. Reuben V. Anderson, Why Mississippi Needs to Pay Attention to National Trends on Punitive
Damages, 71 Miss. L.J. 579, 584 (2001).
241. Thornburgh, supra n.4 at 514-15.
242. Behrens & Silverman, supra n.9 at 422.
243. For a discussion of studies demonstrating that tort reform has been beneficial, see Medical
Liability reform - NOW!, American Medical Association (Feb. 1, 2011) (analyzing empirical evidence
that tort reform measures, including noneconomic damage caps, have had both direct and indirect ben-
efits on the healthcare industry, doctors, insurers, and patients alike); Ronald M. Stewart, Molly West,
Richard Schirmer, & Kenneth R. Sirinek, Tort Reform is Associated with Significant Increases in Texas
Physicians Relative to the Texas Population, Journal of Gastrointestinal Surgery (2012) (peer-reviewed
article finding a significant increase in Texas physicians after enactment of tort reforms); Behrens &
Silverman supra note 9 (empirical evidence that Mississippi's noneconomic damage caps expanded ac-
cess to healthcare and increased business investment).
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the history behind Mississippi's tort reform measures. Failure to learn from
this history is the surest way to risk repeating the crisis. 44
VI. CONCLUSION
There were very real problems with Mississippi's civil justice system 10
years ago. The numerous reform efforts discussed in this Article have
served their intended purpose. Today, many of those reforms go unchal-
lenged, with the exception of Mississippi's cap on noneconomic damages.
While Mississippi's statutory cap on noneconomic damages has faced vari-
ous constitutional challenges, it has and should continue to survive such
attacks. How Mississippi's legal landscape will evolve over the next 10
years remains to be seen, but its course should be guided with an historical
awareness and appreciation for these reforms and the significant problems
they addressed.
Of course, there are studies to the contrary. See Scott Devito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to a
Nonexistent Problem: Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STANFORD J. COM
PLEX LITIG. 62 (2015). While there may be ongoing policy arguments, it cannot be said that Missis-
sippi's civil justice problems were "nonexistent." Nor, in light of Mississippi's disproportionately high
jury verdicts, its reputation as a Mecca for tort claims, and other factors discussed in this article, can it
be said that the tort reform measures were an "overreaction." See e.g. supra notes 2, 3, 12, 88 and
accompanying text. Indeed Mississippi had gained national notoriety as a "judicial hellhole" to the
point that a prominent Mississippi plaintiff's attorney noted that "[any lawyer fresh out of law school
can walk in there and win the case, so it doesn't matter what the evidence or law is." Judicial Hellholes
(2011-2012), supra note 14. Furthermore, there is empirical support that Mississippi's tort reform mea-
sures did indeed address these issues: reduction in mass tort filings, reduction in medical malpractice
premiums, and promotion of business development, to name a few. See Behrens & Silverman, supra
note 9.
244. George Santayana observed that "[t]hose who cannot learn from history are doomed to re-
peat it." George Santayana Quotes, BRAINY QuoTE, (Jul. 18, 2015). http://www.brainyquote.com/
quotes/quotes/g/georgesant101521.html.
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